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THE DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. By Michael J. Phillips. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1983. Pp. x, 226. $29.95.
Sometime in the near future, the individual in the United States
will become subject to increasingly harsh and repressive denials of
freedom - or so says Michael J. Phillips 1 in The Dilemmas ofIndividualism: Status, Liberty, and American Constitutional Law (p. 200).
Ironically, the principal reason for the transformation of America into
an authoritarian regime will be liberalism, through its emphasis on
individual freedom (pp. 165-66):
It would be inaccurate to identify the "liberalism" to which Phillips refers with any particular political group. Instead, Phillips' liberalism "is a body of ideas dominating the entire American political
spectrum" (p. vii). The central goal of liberalism as Phillips describes
it is the emancipation of individuals from all restraints on their ability
to act (pp. 153-56). To achieve this end, liberal freedom must accomplish two things. First, it must remove physical and cultural obstacles
to individual freedom of choice. Second, it must confer upon individuals the capacity to exercise the options available to them. According
to Phillips, the logical conclusion of this sort of liberty is either random or suicidal behavior (pp. 156-58).
1. Michael J. Phillips is an Associate Professor of Business Law at Indiana University's
School of Business. He holds a J.D. degree from Columbia University, and LL.M. and S.J.D.
degrees from the National Law Center at George Washington University.
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Thus, liberal freedom must always be tempered with restraining
influences (p. 161). Phillips contends that the communitarian influences of family, region, religion, morality, and the like no longer provide any meaningful limitation on the self-destructive aspects of
liberalism, because their continued vitality depends upon prejudicial
treatment of certain groups. For example, Phillips asserts that discrimination against women and children "[i]s vital to, if not constitutive of,
the family and the stabilizing and socializing functions it fulfill[s],"
with "the opprobrium visitd [sic] upon homosexuals and illegitimates"
also contributing (p. 164). Similarly, he states that black slavery and
the banishment of American Indians to reservations were elements "of
a social hierarchy that, if nothing else, was ordered" (p. 164). Finally,
the disabilities imposed upon all of these groups "also tended to reinforce the values of localism and community by putting some restraints
on social and geographical mobility" (p. 164). In sum, Phillips sees
prejudice as "reflecting and to some degree forming, a variegated pattern of social ordering" (p. 163). Since liberalism, through the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, prohibits discrimination, it has
destroyed the ability of communitarianism to guide society. 2
In the absence of communitarian values liberalism must seek restraints elsewhere. Phillips interprets the growth of government, corporations, labor unions, and other large organizations as the response
to that need (pp. 167-72). 3 These institutions fail to provide a viable
substitute for the lost community (pp. 164-74), so American society
will instead avoid the self-destructive tendencies of liberalism through
increasing institutional oppression of individuals (pp. 94-96), which
will ultimately take the form of direct control of thought by use of
drugs, behavior modification, and "electrical and chemical stimulation
of the brain" (pp. 200-07).
Confronted with a vision as radical and apocalyptic as this, the
reader expects Phillips to propose a "coherent system of alternative
moral possibilities," but Phillips disappoints this expectation "because
[he has] no such scheme to offer." Instead, he explicitly adopts a "descriptive posture" (p. ix), asserting that there is no escape from the
script he has recited (pp. 199-200). Phillips palliates his projection by
claiming that "it is fairly optimistic" because the alternatives, nuclear
war, economic ruin, or environmental disintegration, are even worse
(p. 207). 4
Although some of Phillips' reasoning invites dispute - for exam2. Note that Phillips neither acknowledges that the equal protection clause bars only arbiand irrational discrimination, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
681 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), nor considers the possibility that this limitation on the reach
of equal protection doctrine might provide the necessary restraint.
3. Phillips contends that individuals have essentially identical relationships with all large
institutions, and that it is therefore unnecessary to distinguish among them. See pp. 69-120.
4. See also p. 196 ("subordination to Russian designs").
trary
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ple, he ignores alternative explanations for the phenomena he observes, such as the impact of technology on the growth of modem
institutions5 - his rhetorical method forces the reader to question his
motives. Throughout his book, Phillips relentlessly distances himself
from the text, using at least four tricks. First, he couches his argument in opaque, confusing jargon.6 Second, he continually uses weak
phrasing in order to express his positions in an equivocal manner. 7
Third, he attributes many of his statements to unspecified third parties. 8 Finally, he argues via proxy, presenting the writings of great philosophers (most frequently Hegel, 9 Hobbes, 10 and Plato 11) in lieu of
his own. By riding on the coattails of these formidable thinkers, Phillips lends his writing a false aura of legitimacy12 and avoids responsibility for his arguments.
5. P. 167 (institutions have grown in order to provide their members with "competitive advantages and increased power," to facilitate the "urge toward the domination and exploitation of
nature," and to fulfill "the need for some alternative form of community"). Phillips' argument is
fundamentally incomplete, see notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text, so there is little to be
gained by responding to its substantive shortcomings.
6. The most important examples are provided by his use of the terms "freedom" and "status." According to Phillips, there are three varieties of freedom: "negative freedom," pp. 3-4;
"authoritarian positive freedom," pp. 9-12; and "liberal positive freedom," p. 13; and two types
of status, "ascribed" and "achieved." P. 8. His work largely depends on the manipulation of
these five terms. One example of Phillips' use of jargon is as follows: "In one version of this
status-positive freedom fusion, ascribed statuses are very significant." P. 10 (footnote omitted).
Phillips burdens other concepts with unnecessarily weighty labels, see, e.g., p. 202 ("corporate
state paradigm"), and forces his reader to digest complex terminology even where a more common word would be unambiguous. See, e.g., p. 206 ("ESB and neuropsychopharmacology" instead of "drugs").
7. See, e.g., p. 6 (supporting a point by claiming that it "is not self-evidently false"); p. 30
("[t]oo often, it appears"); p. 72 ("tend to support"); p. 98 ("may come to involve").
8. See, e.g., p. 89 ("some contend"); p. 96 ("often said").
9. See, e.g., pp. 168-69.
10. See, e.g., pp. 184-85.
11. See, e.g., pp. 189-93. These three are the only writers Phillips discusses at any length, but
he lists other prominent figures when it serves his purpose. See, e.g., p. 5 ("Saint Paul, the Stoics,

Kant").
12. Phillips' disregard of philosophical writings contrary to his position undermines the ability of his citations to legitimate his work. For example, Phillips uses the theories of Thomas
Hobbes to justify his assertion that liberalism leads to totalitarian government. After certifying
Hobbes' liberal credentials (and Hobbes, along with John Locke, is acknowledged as one of the
two originators of the liberal tradition), Phillips paraphrases Hobbes' conclusion that " '[t]he
absolute power of the sovereign . . . was really the necessary complement to . . . individualism.'" P. 184 (quoting G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL THEORY 475 (1961)).
Phillips neglects, however, to respond to the works of Locke. Like Hobbes, Locke presumes
that humanity consists of free individuals. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 309
(1960). The individualism of Locke, contrary to that of Hobbes and Phillips, does not require
state repression. In fact, Locke explicitly denounces authoritarian forms of government: ''Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together." J.
LocKE, supra, at 325 (emphasis in original). American political theory draws largely on the
philosophy of Locke, not Hobbes. Since 'one of Locke's primary purposes was to debunk Hobbes' authoritarian theory, A. GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 19-20, 27-32 (1980), Phillips cannot make effective use of Hobbes without also responding to Locke.
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Phillips bases much of his book on the ground broken by the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, but perverts its teachings in the process. Like Phillips, the Critical Legal scholars point out the
bankruptcy of unqualified liberalism as a means of social organization
and the fundamental contradiction between liberal individualism and
communitarian values. 13 Phillips parts with them, however, when he
asserts that a society must choose either freedom or community (pp.
198-99) and attacks reduced discrimination brought about by enforcement of the equal protection clause.14
To this end, Phillips allots much of his work to describing and
denouncing the law of equal protection (pp. 19-67, 151-64). For example, he opposes due process in juvenile criminal proceedings, student
rights, and equal access to contraception and abortion for minors (p.
27). He believes that government should control the development of
children (p. 30), and that discriminatory treatment is necessary to ensure that children mature in the manner prescribed by the state (p.
25). He makes similar arguments as to women (pp. 20-24) and
blacks. 15
Phillips devotes substantial effort to deprecating affirmative action
(pp. 121-52, 174-78), even though he acknowledges that this criticism
provides little support for his thesis (p. 175). He never mentions the
term "affirmative action," but uses the pejorative expression "reverse
discrimination" instead. 16 He bases his blanket condemnation 17 on
13. Compare, e.g., p. 175 (liberal individualism is self-contradictory), with Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209, 211 (1979) ("Most participants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time
dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve
it.").
14. In contrast, members of Critical Legal Studies emphatically believe that society can in·
corporate a commitment to both individual freedom and communitarian values. See, e.g.,
Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427-28
(1982) (law must incorporate both individualism and communitarianism); Kennedy, supra note
13, at 217 (individual liberty and state coercion can be fused in civil society); Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781, 785-86 (1983) (liberalism is an incomplete social theory, but ''.just as conservatism correctly
emphasizes our mutual dependence, liberalism correctly emphasizes our individuality and the
threats we pose to each other. It may be that we live in a world of tension, in which no unified
social theory but only a dialogue between liberalism and conservatism is possible."). In fact, one
purpose of their criticism is to engineer a better synthesis of these ideals. See, e.g., Kennedy,
FoTJ11 and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1710 (1976) ("What
we need is a way to relate the values intrinsic to form to the values we try to achieve through
form.") (emphasis in original); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 221. But see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
Professor Alan David Freeman addresses the points Phillips raises more specifically. He
insists that the law can integrate equality and justice and criticizes the law for its failure to do so.
See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1103, 1119 (1978).
15. See text following note 16 infra.
16. See, e.g., p. 174.
17. Phillips criticizes every area of affirmative action law: education, pp. 134-35, 138-41; em·
ployment, pp. 135-38; and voting, pp. 142-45.
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the belief that, occasionally laudable purposes 18 notwithstanding, affirmative action constitutes "odious" discrimination (p. 176) and is
merely a "concession to minority political power" created in response
to a "thoroughly egoistic group struggle" (p. 178). 19 Phillips also contends that commitment to affirmative action will cause the government
to take increasingly severe measures to ensure equality, culminating in
"genetic engineering" (p. 177). Ultimately, Phillips hopes for a catastrophe engendering an "authoritarian" backlash that abolishes affirmative action (p. 177).
In essence, Phillips argues that liberalism run amok will compel
American society to choose among a few intolerable alternatives: suicide, incoherence, or tyranny involving government-sponsored drug
addiction and eugenics. Moreover, he claims that the triumph of liberalism depends upon rejection of communitarian values, which is in
turn caused by enforcement of the equal protection clause. A reader
accepting this reasoning is likely to decide that rejecting equal protection might restore communitarianism and avert the occurrence of
Phillips' frightening predictions. Phillips supports this conclusion by
advocating that contemporary society should impose sacrifices on minorities and stating his regret that America's representative democracy presents obstacles to such a program (p. 197). In this light
Phillips' actual purpose, which is quite different from his stated descriptive intent, becomes clear: The Dilemmas of Individualism is a
manifesto for the repudiation of the equal protection clause that goes
beyond rejecting affirmative action, and actually advocates restoring
the most reprehensible varieties of public and private discrimination.
Phillips does not even renounce the view that slavery is the social condition for which blacks are most suited, condemning that institution
only for its excesses (p. 31).
Unfortunately, Phillips lacks the audacity to state his thesis boldly
and defend it forthrightly. 20 In adopting his indirect argumentative
style, Phillips avoids the most important questions. First, he never
considers the possibility that liberty and community might be harmonized. 21 Second, even if the two cannot coexist, Phillips does not at18. Phillips concedes that preferential treatment may sometimes be justifiable to remedy past
injustice and to develop true equality of opportunity. Pp. 132-34.
19. Even if affirmative action is necessary to implement the desired enhancement of the productive capabilities of minority group members, Phillips argues, liberalism will probably destroy
the "nurturing" and "constructive" aspects of the doctrine. P. 178.
20. Phillips' caution in this respect also explains his efforts to dissociate himself from his
writing. See text at notes 6-12 supra.
21. If the law can resolve the conflict between individual and community and avoid the disastrous consequences of that conflict, as Critical Legal Studies teaches, then there is no need to
eviscerate the equal protection clause. The Critical Legal scholars predicate their argument on
the discord between individualistic and communitarian goals, but, directly contrary to Phillips,
argue for legal militancy on behalf of distributive justice. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 13;
Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. R.Ev. 829, 849-57 (1983) (critical
theory seeks to expose, destroy, and replace contract law because it encourages wealthy parties to
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tempt to prove that constitutionally mandated equality is the root of
the conflict. 22 Phillips does himself and his reader a disservice by his
failure to address these pivotal issues, for this shortcoming makes his
startling views neither convincing nor credible, and relegates his book
to the status of an extremist novelty.

exert power over poorer parties); Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 1276, 1295-96 (1984) ("Bureaucracy is ... a primary target for those who seek liberation from modem forms of human domination. . • . Critical theory seeks to undermine" its
existing legal basis and foster individual liberty.); Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the FirstYear Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 896-98 (1979) (law cannot succeed unless it takes steps
to reduce the influence of advantaged parties in "our highly stratified, class-dominated society");
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 771-72 (1981) (contract law
cannot accommodate true freedom without rejecting the premises of present law).
22. Phillips' approach logically requires this result, but he does not explicitly propose rejecting the ideal of equality.

